

Message Text

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PAGE 01 VIENNA 09829 282319Z

64

ACTION ACDA-19

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FM AMEMBASSY VIENNA

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SECDEF WASHDC

INFO USMISSION NATO

AMEMBASSY BONN

AMEMBASSY LONDON

USNMR SHAPE

USCINCEUR

S E C R E T VIENNA 9829

MBFR NEGOTIATIONS

FROM US REP MBFR

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM, NATO

SUBJECT: MBFR NEGOTIATIONS: REPORT OF CONVERSATION
WITH SOVIET DELEGATION MEMBER

FOLLOWING IS REPORT OF CONVERSATION BETWEEN US DEPREP AND SOVIET
DELEGATION MEMBER KVITSINSKIY DISTRIBUTED BY US DEL TO AD HOC
GROUP ON NOVEMBER 28.

BEGIN TEXT

1. BEGIN SUMMARY: US DEP REP HAD CONVERSATION WITH
SOVIET DEL OFFICER (KVITSINSKIY) NOVEMBER 27 AT
LATTER'S INVITATION. KNITSINSKIY INDICATED SOME
SECRET

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PAGE 02 VIENNA 09829 282319Z

WILLINGNESS TO CONSIDER FIRST PHASE OF REDUCTIONS

FOCUSSING ON US/SOVIET FORCES WITH EUROPEAN REDUCTIONS POSTPONED FOR A SECOND PHASE. AS HE DID FROM TIME TO TIME IN PREPARATORY TALKS, KVITSINSKIY COMPLAINED ABOUT UNCOOPERATIVE ATTITUDE OF WESTERN EUROPEAN REPS IN TALKS.

BULK OF CONVERSATION WAS DEVOTED TO LONG RECITAL OF ALLEDGED FEDERAL GERMAN EFFORTS TO STRETCH THE CONTENT OF THE BERLIN AGREEMENT. END SUMMARY.

KVITSINSKIY BEGAN DISCUSSION BY EXPRESSING VIEW THAT LITTLE WOULD HAPPEN IN VIENNA PRIOR TO MID-DECEMBER BREAK. BOTH SIDES WOULD CONTINUE TO EXPRESS GENERAL VIEWPOINTS AND WOULD STAY AT THAT. IT WAS ALSO POSSIBLE THAT HIS KIND OF PROCESS WOULD CONTINUE IN JANUARY. BOTH SIDES SHOULD THINK OF WAYS TO GET DOWN TO CASES AND PROCEED WITH THE REAL BUSINESS OF THE NEGOTIATION. US DEPREP SAID A GOOD START HAD BEEN MADE IN THE NEGOTIATIONS IN A TECHNICAL SENSE. IT WAS NECESSARY TO HAVE SOME GENERAL DISCUSSION ON BOTH SIDES BEFORE MORE SPECIFIC NEGOTIATION BEGAN. AS HE SAW IT, THE PROBLEM FOR JANUARY RECOMMENCEMENT WAS WHAT PART OF THE OVERALL COMPLEX SHOULD BE CHOSEN AS FIRST TOPIC OF MORE DETAILED DISCUSSIONS.

3. KVITSINSKIY ASKED INSISTENTLY WHY IT WAS NECESSARY ACCORDING TO THE ALLIED CONCEPT TO HAVE TWO STAGES OF NEGOTIATIONS. IF ALL FORCES WERE GOING TO BE COVERED, WHY SHOULDN'T THEY BE COVERED FROM THE OUTSET? ACCORDING TO STATEMENTS OF THE WESTERN EUROPEAN REPRESENTATIVES IN VIENNA, THEY DID NOT APPEAR TO WANT NEGOTIATE REDUCTIONS, BUT ONLY TO DELAY THE OPERATION.

4. US DEPREP REPLIED THAT ALL PARTICIPANTS REALIZED THE SUBJECT MATTER WAS COMPLICATED. ALL PARTICIPANTS, AND THE SOVIETS IN PARTICULAR, HAD INDICATED CONCERN THAT THE EFFORT TO IMPROVE THE SECURITY STRUCTURE IN CENTRAL EUROPE WHICH HAD SOME SHORTCOMINGS, NOT RESULT IN INADVERTENT WEAKENING OF THAT STRUCTURE. IT WAS NECESSARY TO FIND SOME PRACTICAL FOCUS FOR THE

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 VIENNA 09829 282319Z

NEGOTIATIONS WHICH WOULD ENABLE PROGRESS TO BE MADE WHILE KEEPING THESE CONCERNS IN MIND. A FOCUS ON THE FORCES OF THE U.S. AND SOVIET UNION SEEMED ONE NATURAL STARTING POINT FOR DETAILED DISCUSSION THOUGH THERE WERE OTHER POSSIBILITIES. KVITSINSKIY RETURNED TO THE THEME THAT THE EUROPEAN ALLIES WERE SHOWING SOME RELUCTANCE TO TAKE ACTUAL STEPS IN THE NEGOTIATIONS. IN CAPITALS AND IN VIENNA, THERE WAS TALK OF WESTERN EUROPEAN DEFENSE

COOPERATION. HOW COULD THERE BE ANY REAL ASSURANCE THAT, IF THE NEGOTIATIONS WERE DIVIDED INTO TWO PHASES, EUROPEAN FORCES WOULD IN FACT BE REDUCED IN THE SECOND PHASE?

5. US DEPREP REPLIED THAT ALL THE ALLIES HAD AGREED TO THE ALLIED PROPSAL FOR A COMMON CEILING AND THE PROPOSAL FOR A SECOND PHASE IN WHICH THE FORCES OF BOTH SIDES WOULD BE FURTHER REDUCED. US DEPREP SAID IT WAS NECESSARY TO BEGIN SOMEWHERE TO TACKLE THE COMPLEX OF PROBLEMS AT SOME SPECIFIC POINT AND IT WAS LOGICAL TO BEGIN WITH US/SOVIET FORCES.

6. KVITSINSKIY THEN HINTED IN A GENERAL WAY THAT IT MIGHT BE POSSIBLE TO ENVISAGE TWO PHASES IF SOVIET INTERESTS ABOUT PHASE TWO COULD BE MET.

7. KVITSINSKIY SAID THAT THE ALLIED PROPOSAL THAT 68,000 SOVIET SOLDIERS SHOULD BE REDUCED IN A FIRST PHASE WAS ASKING FOR TOO MUCH. THE NUMBERS WERE DISPROPORTIONATE. THERE WERE NO BARRACKS AND FACILITIES IN THE SOVIET UNION TO WITHDRAW SUCH A LARGE NUMBER SO RAPIDLY. THE NUMERICAL DISPROPORTION WAS INEQUITABLE. SO WAS THE ABSOLUTE FIGURE. SEVENTEEN PERCENT WAS ALL THE WITHDRAWALS THE SOVIET MILITARY WOULD PUT UP WITH. FURTHERMORE, THE SOVIETS COULDN'T BE EXPECTED TO WITHDRAW A TANK ARMY IF THE U.S. ONLY WITHDREW 20,000 COOKS AND SUPPLYMENT.

8. US DEP REP POINTED OUT THAT SOVIETS THEMSELVES HAD PROPOSED EQUAL PROPORTION REDUCTIONS AND THIS WAS EFFECT OF ALLIED PROPOSAL. SOVIETS SHOULD KEEP IN MIND THAT NO MATTER HOW MANY THEY WITHDREW, THEIR TERRITORY REMAINED CLOSE AND U.S. WAS 3,000 MILES DISTANT. OVERALL DIMENSIONS
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 04 VIENNA 09829 282319Z

OF SOVIET WITHDRAWAL UNDER THEIR OWN PROGRAM SEEMED SIMILAR TO THE NUMBER OF SOVIET WITHDRAWALS UNDER ALLIED PROPOSAL. WHY SHOULD ALLIED PROPOSAL CAUSE SUCH DIFFICULTY?

9. KVITSINSKIY REPLIED THAT ALLIED PROPSAL DID NOT INCLUDE GERMAN FORCES, AND THAT UJMS. COULD BRING BACK SOLDIERS TO GERMANY IN A MATTER OF HOURS USING ITS FLEET OF CIVIL TRANSPORT PLANES: US DEPREP SAID SOVIETS ALSO USED AIR LIFT. KVITSINSKIY SAID SOVIETS HAD NOTHING LIKE US AIR TRANSPORT FLEET. MOREOVER, HE CONTINUED, ALLIED FIGURES WERE WRONG, PARTICULARLY ON 15,500 TANK TOTAL. US DEPREP SAID IF THE SOVIETS WERE IN A POSITION TO PROVE WITH CORROBORATABLE EVIDENCE THAT ALLIED FIGURES WERE WRONG, ALLIES WOULD BE PREPARED TO CONSIDER REVISING

THEM, BUT EVEN KVITSINSKIY WAS NOT DISPUTING THAT SOVIETS
HAD MANY MORE TANKS
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